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In the last two decades a body of literature highlights the role of ﬁnan-
cial frictions for explaining the development of key macroeconomic vari-
ables. Moreover, the ﬁnancial crisis 2007-2009 again sheds light on the
importance of this topic. In this paper, we contribute to the literature
by simultaneously explaining two empirical observations. First, mark-ups
on the loan market react counter-cyclical. Second, the number of banks
operating in the economy signiﬁcantly co-moves with GDP. Therefore, we
develop a DSGE model which incorporates an oligopolistic banking sector
with endogenous bank entry. The resulting model generates signiﬁcant ac-
celerating eﬀects which are even larger than those obtained in the famous
ﬁnancial accelerator model of Bernanke et al. [Bernanke, B., Gertler,
M., Gilchrist, S., 1999. The ﬁnancial accelerator in a quantitative busi-
ness cycle framework. In: Handbook of Macroeconomics. North-Holland,
Amsterdam] and performs remarkable well when comparing the generated
second moments of real and ﬁnancial variables with those observed in the
data.
JEL classiﬁcation: E44; E32
Keywords: Oligopolistic competition; Bank entry; Financial accelerator
∗Email: totzek@economics.uni-kiel.de1 Introduction
As Gertler (1988) states, there already exists a long-standing tradition in macro-
economic theory that emphasizes a central role to ﬁnancial markets in the prop-
agation of cyclical movements. Seminal work reaches back to Fisher (1933) and
Keynes (1936). In the last two decades a body of literature moreover highlights
the role of ﬁnancial frictions for explaining the development of key macroeco-
nomic variables [see amongst others Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), or Gertler
and Kiyotaki (2009)].1 Additionally, the ﬁnancial crisis 2007-2009 again sheds
light on the importance of implementing ﬁnancial frictions into macro mod-
els. In this paper, we contribute to the literature by simultaneously explaining
two empirical observations. First, mark-ups on the loan market react counter-
cyclical. Second, the number of banks operating in the economy signiﬁcantly
co-moves with GDP.
Figure 1 depicts these observations for US data including the corresponding
cross-correlations. As a measure for the mark-up of a commercial bank we
choose the spread between the average majority prime rate charged by banks
on short-term loans to business and the FED’s funds rate.2 The data is logged
and de-trended by application of the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter. Figure 1 shows
that the number of banks signiﬁcantly co-moves with GDP. The corresponding
cross-correlation is 0.49. Moreover, bank mark-ups react counter-cyclical. The
corresponding cross-correlation is -0.88. Further empirical support for non-
stationary price-cost margins of banks is for instance given by Aliaga-D´ ıaz and
Olivero (2010) who highlight the counter-cyclical nature of mark-ups in the
banking sector via VAR forecast error-based methodology for US data [see also
Santos and Winton (2008)]. Moreover, Olivero (2010) provides further empirical
1See Arend (2010) for an insightful overview of newer contributions. See moreover Gertler
(1988) for an excellent overview of ”traditional” approaches incorporating ﬁnancial frictions.
2The data for the loan rate and the number of banks is provided by
http://www.federalreserve.gov
1support for OECD data.




















Figure 1: On the counter-cyclical nature of the number of banks and banks’ mark-up
[US data in logs and HP-ﬁltered]
In the recent literature, the counter-cyclical nature of mark-ups in loan mar-
kets is commonly implemented by assuming an information asymmetry between
borrowers and lenders as for instance in the famous ﬁnancial accelerator model
of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). In this study, the authors integrate
the Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) approach into a New Keynesian
model. Hence, they build up an overlapping generations model where ﬁrms
need physical capital and labor for production. The acquisition of capital is
ﬁnanced either by borrowing or by entrepreneurial net wealth. Competitive ﬁ-
nancial intermediaries ask for an external ﬁnance premium (or: mark-up) over
their marginal costs for ﬁnancing capital. This mark-up is not caused by an
imperfectly competitive environment of ﬁnancial institutions but by the as-
sumption of information asymmetries across borrowers and lenders. Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) moreover assume that the external ﬁnance pre-
mium inversely depends on borrowers net wealth. Therefore, an enhancement
in wealth of borrowers in boom phases leads to a decline in mark-ups in the loan
2market. This in turn increases the net wealth of borrowers and consequently
introduces an ampliﬁcation eﬀect, the famous ﬁnancial accelerator.
By contrast, we do not emphasize mark-up movements from the demand side
of credits.3 Instead, our new ﬁnancial accelerator nests from the supply side of
credits. More precisely, we develop a New Keynesian model which incorporates
an oligopolistic banking sector with endogenous bank entry. This combination
enables us to draw the endogenous causality that an increasing mass of banks
causes the market share of the single bank and thus the resulting mark-up to
decline. As Figure 2 depicts that the latter relation in turn ﬁnds support in
the data since we found a signiﬁcant negative correlation (-0.43) between bank
mark-ups and the number of operating banks, too.









Figure 2: The number of banks and their mark-ups
We follow Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) by assuming that
ﬁrms have to pre-ﬁnance their wage-bill. Therefore, banks provide loans under
oligopolistic competition using deposits and money market credits. Thereby,
our model generates a ﬁnancial accelerator which works as follows. Due to in-
creasing proﬁt opportunities for banks in economic upturns, the mass of banks
increases in response to expansionary shocks. The market share of the single
bank consequently decreases. As a result, banks have to decrease their mark-
ups. Since ﬁrms have to pre-ﬁnance their wage-bill, a decreasing bank mark-up
has in turn a positive eﬀect on the marginal costs of ﬁrms leading to a further
3In the following, we will use the expressions ”credit” and ”loan” synonymously.
3increase in production and thus in loan demand. Consequently, the endoge-
nous mark-up movements resulting from oligopolistic competition4 induces a
multiplier (or: ampliﬁcation) eﬀect, the new ﬁnancial accelerator.
Thereby, our framework provides a new transmission channel for monetary
policy via bank creation which works as follows. A contractionary shock to
the instrument of the central bank, the nominal interest rate, results in four
expansionary eﬀects. (i) Consumption is shifted into the present leading to a
higher loan demand. (ii) The marginal costs of banks decrease. (iii) Bank entry
costs decline, too.5 (iv) The value of a bank which is deﬁned as the discounted
sum of future proﬁts increases due to the lower discount rate. The ﬁrst two
eﬀects result in higher bank proﬁts while the latter two eﬀects have moreover
an expansionary impact on the proﬁtability of bank start-ups which result in
an increase in investment in new banks. All in all, the resulting expansionary
reaction of the mass of operating banks leads to a lower market share of a single
bank and introduces the new ﬁnancial accelerator.6
The analysis of the resulting impulse responses shows that our framework
can indeed depict both the pro-cyclicality of the mass of ﬁnancial intermediaries
as well as the counter-cyclical nature of mark-up movements. Thereby, the
resulting endogenous bank entry generates large ampliﬁcation and persistence
eﬀects. In particular, we obtain signiﬁcantly higher accelerating eﬀects than
those generated by the probably most famous study of BGG. It is moreover
worth mentioning that in contrast with for instance Meh and Moran (2010)
where ampliﬁcation eﬀects are stronger for supply shocks, we also generate
signiﬁcant ampliﬁcation eﬀects from demand shocks.7 Notably, we obtain the
4Remark: In the case of monopolistic competition, the mark-up of a competitor tends to zero.
As a result, the mark-ups are constant in such an environment.
5Remark: We assume that deposits are needed to build up new banks.
6By contrast, the transmission channel for monetary policy in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999) works as follows. An easing of monetary policy increases the return on capital resulting
in an increase in the net wealth of ﬁrms. This in turn causes a decrease in ﬁrm leverage leading
to a reduction of the external ﬁnance premium and thus to a further rise in capital demand.
This in turn leads to an additional expansionary eﬀect for the production sector.
7Meh and Moran (2010) build up a DSGE model in which bank capital mitigates an agency
problem between banks and their creditors. In their approach, the resulting propagation eﬀect
4largest accelerating eﬀect in the case of a monetary policy shock.
Financial crises have taught us that banks do not only propagate shocks but
can also be the source of ﬁnancial disturbances which have important implica-
tions for the real economy. In this context, we investigate the implications of a
contractionary shock to bank value. Our analysis shows that the ﬁnancial shock
results in stagﬂationary eﬀects. The rationale is that the non-stationary bank
mark-up acts as an endogenous cost-push shock for the real economy. Note
however that the aim of this paper is not to explain the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007-
2009. Our framework is naturally too simple to depict such a complex event.
As the famous ﬁnancial accelerator model of BGG, our framework, instead,
represents a further step to solve the puzzle how relatively small shocks can
result in large and persistent eﬀects for the real economy [see amongst others
Mankiw (2001), Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000), and Fuhrer and Moore
(1995)].
As standard in macroeconomics literature, we ﬁnally evaluate our model
by comparing the second moments of the generated series with those observed
in US data. The analysis shows that the model performs remarkable well with
respect to this dimension. In particular, it does not only depict the properties of
key macroeconomic variables appropriately but also those of ﬁnancial variables
including the mass of banks, the amount of aggregate loans, and the amount
of loans per banks. Moreover, we analyze the macroeconomic implications of a
ﬁnancial activity tax and a ﬁnancial transaction tax.8 Our analysis points out
that these two taxes are indeed an appropriate tool to stabilize the ﬁnancial
markets and thus to dampen the volatility of key macroeconomic variables.
We ﬁnd that the ﬁnancial activity tax where banks have to pay a tax on each
transaction is signiﬁcantly more eﬀective than the ﬁnancial transaction tax
results from the bank capital channel.
8For the partial analysis of Tobin (1978) taxes see amongst others Dieci and Westerhoﬀ (2004).
See moreover Lengnick and Wohltmann (2010) who extend a simpliﬁed framework ` a la BGG
for a high frequent asset market in the spirit of the latter study. They show that this extension
leads to signiﬁcantly more persistent dynamics.
5where the tax base is simply per period proﬁts. The rationale is that the
ﬁnancial transaction tax does not only aﬀect the proﬁtability of bank start-ups
but also aﬀects the marginal costs of banks. By contrast, the ﬁnancial activity
tax has not any impact on the marginal costs of banks.
The remainder is structured as follows. In Section 2, we develop the New
Keynesian model incorporating an oligopolistic banking sector with endogenous
bank entry. Moreover, we present a benchmark model and the calibration. In
Section 3, we discuss the impulse responses to a shock to total factor produc-
tivity under diﬀerent assumptions concerning the loan rate stickiness and the
survival probability of new banks. We moreover present the new transmission
mechanism of monetary policy when considering a shock to the interest rate.
Furthermore, we analyze the impulse responses to a ﬁscal demand stimulus and
to a contractionary shock to bank value. The evaluation of the bank entry
model is presented in Section 4 by comparing the generated second moments
with the data. The last section concludes.
2 The Model
Beside the central bank, the model consists of four types of agents, namely
households, intermediate good producers (or: ﬁrms), retailers, and banks. We
assume that ﬁrms have to pre-ﬁnance their wage bill [see amongst others Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005)]. Beside that, ﬁrms are totally standard.
They produce using labor and sell their diﬀerentiated intermediate goods under
monopolistic competition to the retailers.
Banks provide loans to ﬁrms under oligopolistic competition using deposits
and money market credits. Thereby, the mark-up of a single bank endogenously
depends on the degree of competition, i.e. on the mass of banks operating in
the loan market. Caused by endogenous bank entry and exit, the mass of banks















































































































Figure 3: Model structure
Households can invest in interest bearing deposits with a duration of one
period at a bank. They moreover supply their working force to ﬁrms. The
retailers bundle the diﬀerentiated intermediate goods to a ﬁnal good and sell it
under perfectly competitive conditions to the households. Monetary policy is
simply represented by a standard Taylor rule. The complete model structure is
depicted in Figure 3.
2.1 Households

















subjected to its period-by-period budget constraint
Bt
Pt





7where σ > 0 and η > 0 are the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, respectively. χ > 0 is a
scaling parameter. β ∈ (0,1) represents the private discount factor. According
to (2), the household uses its net income for consumption, Ct, and investment
in deposits, Bt. Lt is labor supply. τt, wt, RB
t , and Pt denote transfers, the
real wage, the gross nominal deposit rate, and the price index, respectively. E
denotes the rational expectations operator.
The household’s optimization results in the standard Euler consumption















where πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 is the gross inﬂation rate.
2.2 Retailers












where Yt denotes the ﬁnal good. θ is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution
between intermediate goods.9









9Remark: We follow the recent literature by assuming that the mass of ﬁrms is normalized to
one. This implies that in contrast to the banking sector, the mass of ﬁrms is assumed to be
constant. See Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007) for a macro model with endogenous ﬁrm
entry.
8where pj,t is the price of the intermediate good j.








As in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), we assume that ﬁrms have
to pre-ﬁnance their wage bill [see also Henzel et al. (2009), H¨ ulsewig, Meyer,
and Wollmersh¨ auser (2009), and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010)]. Be-
side this assumption, ﬁrms are totally standard. For production, they need
only labor. Firms act under monopolistic competition and sell their diﬀerenti-
ated intermediate good to the retailers being faced with a sticky price setting
mechanism.
The production function of a ﬁrm j is given by
yj,t = Atlj,t (8)
where lj,t denotes the labor demand of ﬁrm j. At is a technology shock which
follows an AR(1) process: At/A = (At−1/A)ρa
exp{εa
t} where εa
t is white noise.







t and wt are the gross nominal loan rate and the real wage, respectively.
Equation (9) implies symmetry across ﬁrms, i.e. mcj,t = mct, since the right-
hand side of (9) does not include any ﬁrm speciﬁc variables depending on j.
We moreover assume ﬁrms to be faced with quadratic price adjustment costs





















subjected to the optimal goods demand of the retailer given by equation (7).
∆0,t denotes the stochastic real discount factor. κf can for instance be inter-
preted as menu costs. E denotes the rational expectations operator.
The optimization yields a standard Phillips curve
θ − 1 = θmct − κf
"










where πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 is the gross inﬂation rate and the ratio Et∆0,t+1/∆0,t =
β(EtCt+1/Ct)−σ follows from the Euler consumption equation (3).
As will be shown later, the aggregate loan rate – which is a component of the
marginal costs according to (9) – is a function of the central bank’s instrument,
the money market rate. As a result, the combination of (9) and (11) indicates
that the assumption that ﬁrms have to pre-ﬁnance their wage bill results in a
cost channel. There is empirical support that the direct cost eﬀects of short-
run nominal interest rates signiﬁcantly contribute to inﬂation dynamics. In
particular, Chowdhury, Hoﬀmann, and Schabert (2006) and Ravenna and Walsh
(2006) respectively show the existence of a signiﬁcant impact of the interest rate
on the marginal costs via Phillips curve GMM estimations for the majority of
the G7 countries and the US economy. Other studies as for instance Henzel
et al. (2009), H¨ ulsewig, Meyer, and Wollmersh¨ auser (2009), and Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) also support the existence of a cost channel
by methods of indirect inference for the Euro Area and the US economy. In
addition Barth and Ramey (2001) show that based on industry level data the
interest rate has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the marginal costs of ﬁrms.10
10Remark: The empirical evidence that the cost channel does not seem to be present is restricted
102.4 Banking Sector
Banks – indexed with i – supply loans to ﬁrms under oligopolistic competition
using deposits and money market credits.11











where oi,t denotes the real loan supply of bank i and ζ > 1 is the intratemporal
elasticity between loans. Nt > 1 is the non-stationary mass of banks operating
in the economy.














i,t represents the gross loan rate set by bank i.
In a ﬁrst step, we assume the loan rate to be ﬂexible. Per period proﬁt of a
bank i is then given by
di,t = rL
i,toi,t − RB
t bi,t − RM
t mi,t (14)
where mi,t is the net position on the money market. RM
t is the gross money
market rate which represents the central bank’s tool for monetary policy in-
terventions. bi,t is the real amount of deposits used for loan supply by bank
i and RB
t represents the corresponding nominal gross deposit rate. Following
Henzel et al. (2009) and H¨ ulsewig, Meyer, and Wollmersh¨ auser (2009), we
assume deposits and money market credits to be perfect substitutes. Conse-
quently, the corresponding rates have to coincide, RM
t = RB
t [see also Freixas
and Rochet (1997)]. This assumption implies that banks act under oligopolis-
to the Bayesian estimation of Rabanal (2007) for US data.
11See Henzel et al. (2009) or H¨ ulsewig, Meyer, and Wollmersh¨ auser (2009) for a corresponding
approach with monopolistic competition and a constant mass of banks.
11tic competition on the loan market while they price deposits competitively. A
similar assumption can also be found in amongst others Henzel et al. (2009)
and H¨ ulsewig, Meyer, and Wollmersh¨ auser (2009) and ﬁnds support in the em-
pirical literature since there exists a vast body of studies providing evidence
for market power in the loan market [see amongst others Matthews, Murinde,
and Zhao (2007), Claessens and Laeven (2004), DeBandt and Davis (2000), and
Molyneux, Lloyd-Williams, and Thornton (1994)]. By contrast and as already
pointed out by Olivero (2010), the empirical evidence for the deposit side is
very restricted.









which results from (12) and (13). Moreover, the bank is faced with the balance
sheet constraint:
bi,t + mi,t ≥ oi,t (16)
implying that the amount of loans is restricted by the amount of deposits and
money market credits.12 In the optimum equation (16) holds with equality.13
Inserting this expression and RM
t = RB




















12In order to keep the model simple, we abstract from an interbanking market. See for instance
Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) for a New Keynesian model incorporating a banking sector
with interbank lending.



















In contrast to the case of monopolistic competition, the individual loan rate,
rL
i,t, has in turn a direct impact on the aggregate loan rate, RL
t , and thus on
























(λi,t − 1) (21)















where the mark-up is given by
µi,t =
(1 − λi,t)ζ






Equation (24) implies that if the market share of the single bank tends to
zero, we end up with the special case of monopolistic competition where the
14Remark: Monopolistic competition was introduced by Chamberlin (1933). The point of mo-
nopolistic competition is not to study strategic aspects between competitors such as price
competition but to abstract from these issues to simplify the analysis [see also Blanchard and
Kiyotaki (1987)]. By contrast, these aspects are considered under oligopolistic competition.
13mark-up, µi,t, is constant since ∂RL
t /∂rL
i,t → 0 ⇔ λi,t → 0.15 Due to the
assumption of oligopolistic competition it however follows that even in the case
of completely ﬂexible loan rates the mark-up of a bank i is non-stationary.
Empirical studies have however shown that the loan rate is rigid [see amongst
others Henzel et al. (2009) or Gerali et al. (2010)]. We thus extend our frame-
work by assuming quadratic loan rate adjustment costs, LACt, in the spirit of












where κb can for instance be interpreted as menu costs.16
The intertemporal optimization of a bank’s proﬁt with respect to the loan
rate, rL












































By setting κb = 0, we would end up with (23).
2.5 Bank Creation
For modelling bank entry and exit, we apply a mechanism which is analogous
to the ﬁrm entry model of Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Bilbiie, Ghironi, and
Melitz (2007).17
By assumption, there exists an unbounded mass of potential banks which
15The mark-up would then be given by ζ/(ζ − 1) = const.
16Naturally, these costs are rather small in the banking sector. Gerali et al. (2010) estimate the
menu costs of ﬁrms to be more than three times larger than those in the loan markets.
17See amongst others Colciago and Etro (2010a,b) and Faia (2009) for ﬁrm entry models with
oligopolistic competition in the goods market.
14want to enter the market if their entry is proﬁtable. Before entry, entrants
have to pay a sunk cost. These costs are assumed to be proportional to the real
marginal costs, i.e. the real interest rate, e RB
t ≡ RB
t /Etπt+1.18 This implies that
new banks are created by using deposits. We further assume a time-to-build
lag in new bank creation. This assumption ﬁnds support in the data since the
correlation between the mass of banks in t+1 and GDP in t is even larger [0.51]
than the contemporaneous cross-correlation. This ﬁnding is totally analogous
to ﬁrm entry data [see amongst others Devereux, Head, and Lapham (1996) or
Totzek (2010)].
The following zero-proﬁt condition determines the mass of entrants by align-
ing bank value, vt, with the entry cost, fE:
vt = fE e RB
t (28)
where the value of a bank is given by the present value of future proﬁts, i.e. the


















where δ ∈ (0,1) denotes the death probability of a bank.
Due to the assumption of a time-to-build lag, banks only consider future
proﬁts in their entry decision. In order to analyze exogenous changes in the
value of banks, we add an autoregressive shock process, uv





t is white noise.
18In Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007) ﬁrms have to pay entry costs proportional to the eﬀective
real wage, i.e. their marginal costs.
19Equation (29) is the forward solution of (30).
15As in the ﬁrm entry model of Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007), we assume
the recursive law of motion of the mass of banks to be given by
Nt+1 = (1 − δ)(Nt + NE,t) (31)
where NE,t denotes the mass of new banks. Equation (31) states that a fraction,
δ, of incumbent and new banks is hit by an exogenous death shock at the very
end of each period.20
2.6 Aggregation
Symmetry across banks implies oi,t = ot and rL
i,t = rL
t . According to (12) and











An increasing mass of banks ceteris paribus results in a rise in aggregate loans
and in a decline in the loan rate.
Inserting (32) and (33) in equation (22) yields




implying that the market share of the single bank declines if the mass of banks
increases. This in turn implies that the mark-up of a bank – also under ﬂexible
20Naturally, the assumption of a constant exit rate is a simpliﬁcation. However, Totzek (2010)
shows in a model with simultaneous ﬁrm entry and exit that the qualitative results do not
change when endogenizing the ﬁrm exit rate. Instead, he points out that the assumption
of simultaneous endogenous entries and exits just results in a marginal ampliﬁcation eﬀect
when compared to the case of endogenous entries but exogenous exits. Further note that we
relax the assumption of a constant death rate of banks by introducing an endogenous survival
probability of new banks to the model in Section 3.1.3.
16loan rates – decreases if the mass of banks rises. Since µi,t = µt and
µt =
(Nt − 1)ζ







[(N − 1)ζ − N]2 < 0 (36)
Our model thus draws an endogenous causality between the mass of op-
erating banks and their mark-up which captures the corresponding negative
correlation that we observed in the data [cf. Figure 2].
The real marginal costs of ﬁrms are given by equation (9). Inserting (23),











implying that beside the pure cost channel, i.e. the direct inﬂuence of the
nominal interest rate, there exists an endogenous cost-push shock resulting
from endogenous bank entry and exit of oligopolistic competitors and their
non-stationary mark-ups. Consequently, an expansionary reaction of the mass


































(Nt − 1)ζ − Nt
￿
ζ







since Nt > ζ/(ζ − 1) > 1 ⇔ (Nt − 1)ζ − Nt > 0.
21Note that the mark-up, µt, is larger than one if Nt > ζ/(ζ − 1). We calibrate ζ to 6 implying
that Nt > 1.2. The numerically computed steady state value of Nt is 1.4.
17Aggregate production is given by
Yt = Ct + Gt +
κf
2
(πt − 1)2Yt (39)






t is white noise. We moreover deﬁne GDP as ag-
gregate production plus investment
Y GDP
t ≡ Yt + NE,tvt (40)
where NE,tvt is interpreted as investment in new banks.22
The loan market clearing condition follows






























t is white noise.
The complete New Keynesian model with endogenous entry of oligopolistic
banks can be found in Table 1.
2.7 Calibration
As standard in the literature, we set the private discount factor, β, to 0.99
implying a steady state of the annual nominal interest rate of about 4%. We
calibrate both the intertemporal elasticity and the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply to one which is also standard. In particular, this implies that log con-
22An equivalent deﬁnition can be found in Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007).
18θ − 1 = θmct − κfEt
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(Nt − 1)ζ − Nt

























Table 1: The complete New Keynesian model with endogenous entry of oligopolistic
banks
sumption enters the utility function. As in Smets and Wouters (2007), we set
the steady state government spending/GDP ratio to 18% which is moreover
the value calculated by Trabandt and Uhlig (2009) for the US economy. The
intratemporal elasticity between intermediate goods, θ, is set to 11 implying a
steady state mark-up of 10% in the goods market. The price stickiness para-
meter, κf, is assumed to be 77 as estimated in Ireland (2001). We moreover
19abstract from trend inﬂation, i.e. π = 1.
The elasticity between the loans, ζ, is calibrated to 6 in order to obtain
an equivalent ζ/θ-ratio as in Gerali et al. (2010). When assuming the loan
rates to be sticky, we moreover set the loan rate stickiness parameter, κb, to
22.43 in order to obtain the same slope of the loan rate equation, (ζ −1)/κb, as
estimated in Gerlai et al. (2010). When assuming loan rates to be ﬂexible, κb
is zero. We calibrate the bank death rate, δ, to the empirically observed value,
0.013.23 To match the data appropriately, we set the entry costs, fE, to 6. The
scaling parameter, χ, is endogenously determined by the steady state system
to ensure that in steady state total hours worked is 1/3. We moreover apply a
standard Taylor rule, with λπ = 1.5 and λy = 0.125.
Finally, we calibrate the shock processes to the estimated values of Smets
and Wouters (2007), i.e. we respectively set the persistence of the shock to
technology, to government spending, and to the interest rate to 0.95, 0.97, and
0.15. The corresponding standard errors are 0.45, 0.53, and 0.24, respectively.
Without loss of generality, we assume the shock to bank value to occur with a
shock persistence of 0.95. The corresponding standard error is normalized to
0.01.
2.8 The Benchmark New Keynesian Model
In order to obtain an appropriate benchmark for our analysis, we apply a stan-
dard New Keynesian model with a cost channel. The model is characterized
by a completely competitive banking sector whose mass is constant and nor-
malized to one. As a result, the banks do not ask for a mark-up such that
RL
t = RB
t . The complete benchmark model can be found in Table 2. For
the sake of comparability, we apply the same calibration as for the bank entry
model.
23The data is provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
20θ − 1 = θmct − κfEt
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Table 2: The complete benchmark New Keynesian model
2.9 Stability Analysis
Surico (2008) provides the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for determinacy
for our benchmark model, the New Keynesian model with a cost channel and
a standard Taylor rule. Llosa and Tuesta (2009) and Br¨ uckner and Schabert
(2003) moreover study how diﬀerent monetary policy rules may aﬀect determi-
nacy. The studies highlight that in contrast to the standard New Keynesian
model, there exists an upper bound to the output reaction in the monetary
policy rule if the cost channel is existent.












Figure 4: Regions of determinacy
Figure 4 shows the regions of determinacy for the bank entry model. In
comparison with the ﬁndings of Surico (2008), the ﬁgure indicates that the
21region of determinacy remains approximately unaﬀected. In particular, this
implies that also in our framework, there exists an upper bound to λy which
increases if λπ ≥ 1 is increased.
3 Impulse Responses
3.1 The Technology Shock
In this section, we will investigate the impulse responses to an expansionary
technology shock. Thereby, we will analyze the impact of the loan rate rigidity
and the survival probability of new banks. In the following, we will refer to the
model speciﬁcation with ﬂexible loan rates and exogenous exits as the baseline
bank entry model.
3.1.1 The Baseline Bank Entry Model
Figure 5 shows the impulse responses to an aggregate technology shock of the
baseline bank entry model.24



































































Figure 5: Impulse responses to an expansionary technology shock
In line with empirical evidence of amongst others Smets and Wouters (2003,
24The number of years are on the abscissa. However, we interpret periods as quarters. On the
ordinate we plot the percentage deviation of a variable from the corresponding steady state
value, i.e. xt = (Xt − X)/X, where X denotes the steady state value.
222007), the innovation causes inﬂation to decrease while output increases. Since
ﬁrms have to pre-ﬁnance their wage-bill, the demand for loans reacts expan-
sionary, too. The drop in the nominal interest rate moreover leads to a decline
in the marginal costs of banks. All in all, the proﬁt opportunities of banks
increase which cause new banks to enter the market and consequently induces
a boom in investment in new banks. The latter eﬀect is moreover ampliﬁed by
the decline in the nominal interest rate which leads to lower entry costs. In
Section 3.2, we come to this point into more detail.
The expansionary reaction of the mass of operating banks leads to a drop in
the market share of the single banks [cf. equation (34)]. Consequently, banks
decrease their mark-ups. As already mentioned, the mark-up of banks acts as
an endogenous cost-push shock [cf. equation (37)] which reacts expansionary
in this case. The declining mark-up thus results in a drop in ﬁrms’ marginal
costs which leads to a further increase in production and consequently in loan
demand. As a result, the endogenous bank mark-up introduces a multiplier
eﬀect, the new ﬁnancial accelerator.
In order to measure the quantitative size of our ﬁnancial accelerator, Figure
6 shows the impulse responses to an aggregate technology shock of the base-
line bank entry model (dashed lines) in comparison with the benchmark New
Keynesian model (solid lines).

























Figure 6: Impulse responses of the baseline bank entry model (BEM) to an expan-
sionary technology shock in comparison with the benchmark New Keynesian model
(NKM)
When comparing the quantitative eﬀects of both models, it turns out that
the new ﬁnancial accelerator leads to a signiﬁcant propagation in the reaction of
23output. This eﬀect is even more pronounced in the case of GDP since investment
in new banks additionally increases [cf. Figure 5].
The ﬁnancial accelerator in our model is driven by two eﬀects. First, due
to the declining mark-up the contractionary reaction of the loan rate is more
pronounced in the bank entry model leading to lower marginal costs for ﬁrms.
Second, investment in new banks is a component of GDP. All in all, endog-
enizing the mass of oligopolistic banks leads a signiﬁcant ampliﬁcation eﬀect.
Moreover, Figure 6 shows that the reactions in the bank entry model turn out
to be more persistent, too. Our framework is thus a further step to solve the
puzzle how relatively small shocks can result in large and persistent eﬀects for
the real economy [see amongst other Mankiw (2001), Chari et al. (2000), and
Fuhrer and Moore (1995)].
When comparing the quantitative accelerating eﬀects with BGG, it turns
out that our model generates even higher ampliﬁcation eﬀects than the fa-
mous ﬁnancial accelerator model. BGG conclude that their ﬁnancial accelerator
model generates about 50% ampliﬁcation of the initial reaction of GDP.25 Figure
6 however indicates that the assumption of an endogenous mass of oligopolistic
banks results in an initial ampliﬁcation eﬀect of about 100%.
All in all, our model is able to capture the empirical ﬁndings that (i) bank
mark-ups react counter-cyclical and (ii) the positive co-movement of the mass
of banks with GDP and to generate signiﬁcant ampliﬁcation and persistence
eﬀects.
3.1.2 The Bank Entry Model with Sticky Loan Rates
Up to now, we have assumed that loan rates are ﬂexible. However, there exists
empirical evidence that loan rates are rigid [see amongst others Henzel et al.
(2009) or Gerali et al. (2010)]. Figure 7 shows the impulse responses to an
25Note however that Christensen and Dib (2008) estimate a New Keynesian model incorporat-
ing the BGG framework for the US. They show that the presence of a ﬁnancial accelerator
mechanism ` a la BGG signiﬁcantly ampliﬁes the impact of demand-side shocks but dampens
the rise of investment to a shock to technology.
24aggregate technology shock under ﬂexible (solid lines) and under sticky loan
rates (dashed lines).




































Figure 7: Impulse responses to an expansionary technology shock with sticky loan rates
in comparison with the baseline model with ﬂexible loan rates
The ﬁgure indicates that the introduction of sticky loan rates as a further
nominal rigidity does not make much diﬀerence for the resulting dynamics. The
reaction of the loan rate becomes naturally somewhat smoother. However, when
compared to the case of ﬂexible loan rates the resulting dynamics of the mass
of banks and GDP do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly. The reactions are just slightly
less expansionary.
3.1.3 The Bank Entry Model with an Endogenous Survival Proba-
bility of New Banks
For the sake of simplicity, we have assumed exits to be exogenous as in the ﬁrm
entry models of amongst others Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007).26 For the
following exercise, we want to abstract from this assumption and alternatively
assume that the survival probability for new banks depends negatively on the
26See Totzek (2010) for a model with a microfounded incentive-based mechanism of simultaneous
endogenous ﬁrm entry and exit.
25mass of new start ups.27 Applying this assumption on the mass of banks in the
market, results in:
Nt+1 = (1 − δ)(Nt + F(NE,t/NE,t−1)) (43)
with F(NE,t/NE,t−1) ≡ [1 − S(NE,t/NE,t−1)]NE,t where S(·) has the following
properties: S(1) = S′(1) = 0 and S′′(1) is constant and strictly positive.28
Technically, this mechanism is similar to investment adjustment costs as for
instance assumed in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005).
We further assume S′′(1) = 2.48 which is the value that Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Evans (2005) estimate for capital investment adjustment costs. A










The impulse responses to an expansionary technology shock are shown in
Figure 8 in comparison with the baseline bank entry model and the benchmark
New Keynesian model. We assume the loan rate to be ﬂexible again.


























Figure 8: Impulse responses to an expansionary technology shock with an endogenous
survival probalitity (ESP) in comparison with the baseline bank entry model (BEM)
and the benchmark New Keynesian Model (NKM)
Figure 8 indicates that the assumption of an endogenous survival probability
of new banks has quantitative and qualitative eﬀects for the resulting dynam-
ics. The endogenous survival probability of new banks which increases in the
27An equivalent mechanism can be found in the extended ﬁrm entry model ` a la Bilbiie, Ghironi,
and Melitz (2007) outlined in Lewis (2009).
28When setting S(·) = 0 ⇔ F(·) = NE,t, we end up with our baseline model.
26mass of start-ups naturally dampens the expansionary reaction of the mass of
banks. Moreover, we can now generate a hump-shaped adjustment pattern in
GDP which naturally comes at the costs of a lower impact reaction and thus of
a smaller initial ﬁnancial accelerator. Note however that the model still gener-
ates a signiﬁcant ampliﬁcation and persistence eﬀect in GDP and output when
compared to the benchmark New Keynesian model.
3.2 The Interest Rate Shock: A New Transmission Channel for
Monetary Policy
In this section, we will describe our new transmission channel for monetary
policy. In order to diﬀerentiate this concept from that of the traditional ﬁnancial
accelerator model, we start by illustrating the transmission channel in BGG.
BGG integrate the Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) approach into a
New Keynesian model. Hence, they build up an overlapping generations model
where ﬁrms need physical capital and labor for production. The acquisition of
capital is ﬁnanced either by borrowing or by entrepreneurial net wealth. Finan-
cial intermediaries ask for an external ﬁnance premium (or: mark-up) over their
marginal costs for providing capital. This mark-up is not caused by an imper-
fectly competitive environment of ﬁnancial institutions but by the assumption
of information asymmetries across borrowers and lenders. BGG moreover as-
sume that the external ﬁnance premium inversely depends on borrowers net
wealth. The transmission channel for monetary policy in BGG now works as
follows. An easing of monetary policy increases the return on capital resulting
in an increase in the net wealth of ﬁrms. This in turn causes a decrease in ﬁrm
leverage leading to a reduction of the external ﬁnance premium and thus to a
further rise in capital demand.
In contrast to BGG, we do not emphasize the mark-up movements from the
demand side of credit. Instead, our ﬁnancial accelerator nests from the supply
side. A decrease in the nominal interest rate results in four expansionary eﬀects.
































































Figure 9: Impulse responses to an expansionary shock to the interest rate
(i) consumption is shifted to the present leading to a higher loan demand. (ii)
the marginal costs of banks decrease.29 (iii) bank entry costs decline, too. (iv)
the decrease in the real stochastic discount factor causes the value of a bank
to increase. The ﬁrst two eﬀects result in higher bank proﬁts while the latter
two eﬀects have moreover an expansionary impact on the proﬁtability of bank
start-ups. This in turn results in an increase in investment in new banks. The
resulting expansionary reaction of the mass of operating banks then leads to a
declining mark-up in the loan market.30 Since ﬁrms have to pre-ﬁnance their
wage-bill, a decreasing mark-up has a positive eﬀect on their marginal costs
leading to a further increase in production and thus in loan demand.31 This in
turn induces the new ﬁnancial accelerator. Figure 9 shows the corresponding
impulse responses.
Figure 10 shows that the endogenous bank entry mechanism leads to a sig-
niﬁcant ampliﬁcation eﬀect when compared to the benchmark New Keynesian
model. The eﬀect is again larger than that generated by the ﬁnancial accel-
erator in BGG. BGG only generate an ampliﬁcation eﬀect of about 50%. By





30Note that the latter eﬀect is absent when assuming monopolistic competition since then the
bank mark-up would not decrease when new banks enter the market.
31Remark: Under monopolistic competition the bank mark-up would be constant such that this
expansionary eﬀect would not occur.




























Figure 10: Impulse responses of the baseline bank entry model (BEM) to an expan-
sionary shock to monetary policy in comparison with the benchmark New Keynesian
model (NKM)
contrast, the shock results in much larger propagation eﬀects with respect to
output and GDP in our framework. As Figure 9 depicts, the easing in monetary
policy results in a massive increase in investment in new banks. This in turn
ampliﬁes the boom in GDP. Moreover, our bank entry model again generates
signiﬁcantly more persistent dynamics.
3.3 The Shock to Government Spending
In this section, we will analyze a shock to government spending. For this
exercise, we deviate from our baseline calibration and assume that the monetary
authority follows a Taylor rule with the original coeﬃcients of Taylor (1993), i.e.
λπ = 1.5 and λy = 0.5. Figure 11 shows the corresponding impulse responses.
At the end of this section, we will investigate how monetary policy aﬀects the
results.
Figure 11 shows that output and loan demand increase. The drop in the
nominal interest rate lowers the marginal costs of banks. Consequently, the
shock generates additional proﬁt opportunities for existing and potential banks.
This in turn leads to higher investments and thus to an increasing mass of banks.
In comparison with the shock to monetary policy and to total factor productiv-
ity, the expansionary reaction of the mass of operating banks is however about
ten times smaller.
In comparison with the benchmark model, Figure 12 shows that the bank
entry model generates only small ampliﬁcation eﬀects with respect to output


































































Figure 11: Impulse responses to an expansionary shock to government spending
and GDP. The rationale is the comparatively small expansionary reaction of
the mass of banks and consequently that the drop in bank mark-ups turns
out to be rather small [cf. Figure 11]. The ampliﬁcation of output and GDP
respectively amount to 36% and 46%. The latter approximately corresponds
with the ampliﬁcation eﬀect in BGG.





























Figure 12: Impulse responses of the baseline bank entry model (BEM) to an expansion-
ary shock to government spending in comparison with the benchmark New Keynesian
model (NKM)
Figure 11 shows that the ﬁscal demand stimulus leads to a decline in inﬂation
which is ad odds with the empirical evidence of amongst others Smets and
Wouters (2007, 2003). However, Linnemann and Schabert (2003) show within
the baseline New Keynesian model that the qualitative reaction of inﬂation
crucially depends on the design of monetary policy. In particular, the Taylor
rule coeﬃcient λy is the decisive factor. Linnemann and Schabert (2003) show





















































Figure 13: On the impact of monetary policy
Figure 13 indicates that we obtain exactly the same result in our framework.
As in the baseline New Keynesian model without a cost channel, inﬂation and
the nominal interest rate only increase if λy = 0. However and in contrast to the
standard New Keynesian model, the cost channel leads to a more expansionary
reaction of output if the monetary authority reacts to output, too, i.e. if λy >
0. The rationale is that the reaction of the nominal interest rate causes the
marginal costs of ﬁrms to decrease. Consequently, λy > 0 has a positive impact
on production via the cost channel. This result holds in both the bank entry
model and the benchmark New Keynesian model.
In the bank entry model, a drop in the interest rate moreover leads to a
downward pressure on the entry costs. Inversely, an increase in the interest rate
leads to an increase in the entry costs. This is the case for λy = 0 and for λy =
0.125 in the longer-run. As Figure 13 depicts, the reaction of output moreover
turns negative in the longer-run if λy ∈ {0,0.125}. This naturally dampens
the proﬁt opportunities of incumbent and new banks. The development of the
mass of banks consequently indicates that the additional proﬁt opportunities
only cover the entry costs, if λy ≥ 0.5. Otherwise, the mass of banks declines.32
32This result is in line with the ﬁndings of Totzek and Winkler (2010) who show within an
estimated ﬁrm entry model that the reaction of the mass of ﬁrms is ambiguous in the case of a
ﬁscal demand shock whereas it is unambiguous for other shocks, as for instance a technology
313.4 The Shock to Bank Value
As a consequence of the subprime bust in 2007, banks around the globe lost in
value. Since we apply a rather simple model, we exogenously add such a value
shock to equation (30). Figure 14 shows the corresponding impulse responses.
In contrast to the previously analyzed shocks, the shock to bank value does
not directly aﬀect the real economy, i.e. the goods market. Instead, it only
has a direct impact on the entry decision of new banks. The spill-over to the
real economy consequently occurs only via mark-up movements in the banking
sector, i.e. the endogenous cost push shock.
































































Figure 14: Impulse responses to a contractionary shock to bank value
As entering the market becomes less proﬁtable for new banks, investment
in new banks decreases. Since the mass of banks reacts contractionary, the
mark-up of banks increases [cf. equation (38)] leading to higher marginal costs
for ﬁrms. The resulting endogenous cost-push shock consequently reacts con-
tractionary in this case [cf. equation (36)]. The shock to bank value thus leads
to stagﬂation.
Figure 14 however shows that inﬂation initially declines before the reaction
turns positive. However, this result is driven by monetary policy. As the mass
of banks decreases, the declining mark-up leads to an upward-pressure on the
shock.
32loan rate and thus on inﬂation. By contrast, the expansionary monetary policy
reaction decreases the marginal costs of banks leading to a downward-pressure
on inﬂation.
All in all, this exercise shows that in line with the observation in the ﬁnancial
crisis 2007-2009 (and previous ﬁnancial crisis, too) banks do not only propagate
shocks but can also be the source of macroeconomic disturbances.
4 Second Moments
Business cycle models are traditionally evaluated by comparing the second mo-
ments of the generated series with those observed in the data [see amongst
others King and Rebelo (1999)]. In this section, we thus want to report, how
the presented model performs along this dimension. Moreover, we analyze the
impact of the introduction of a ﬁnancial transaction tax and a ﬁnancial activity
tax on the generated ﬁnancial and macroeconomic volatility.
4.1 The Baseline Bank Entry Model
For this exercise, we simulate the reaction of the baseline bank entry model to
the aggregate productivity shock 500 times for 500 quarters. We then discard
the ﬁrst 411 quarters to obtain the same sample size as in the data set.33 We
use the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with a smoothing parameter of 105. It is worth
mentioning that we do not deviate from our baseline calibration in this exercise.
Table 3 reports the resulting moments of the baseline bank entry model34
(normal numbers) and the resulting moments of the benchmark New Keynesian
model (italic numbers in parenthesis). Moreover, Table 3 shows the values
calculated from US data (bold numbers). The data range is 1988:Q1-2010:Q1
due to the restricted availability of the number of banks data. As a measure for
33The data set is described below.
34In line with the impulse response analysis of Section 3.1, the introduction of loan rate stickiness
does not signiﬁcantly alters the generated second moments. In particular, they are virtually
indistinguishable.
33loans and for the mark-up of a commercial bank, we respectively choose total
loans and investments at all commercial banks and the spread between the
average majority prime rate charged by banks on short-term loans to business
and the FED’s funds rate. The data for the remaining macroeconomic variables
is standard.35
Standard deviation Relative standard First-order autocor-
σX deviation σX/σGDP relation Et(Xt,Xt−1)
GDP 1.23 1.25 (0.83) 1.00 1.00 (1.00) 0.89 0.84 (0.82)
C 1.04 1.01 (0.82) 0.85 0.81 (0.98) 0.87 0.86 (0.82)
I 5.01 2.36 (n.a.) 4.08 1.89 (n.a.) 0.93 0.83 (n.a.)
w 1.02 1.43 (1.01) 0.83 1.14 (1.22) 0.79 0.89 (0.82)
O 1.89 1.88 (n.a.) 1.54 1.51 (n.a.) 0.82 0.90 (n.a.)
o 1.71 1.71 (n.a.) 1.39 1.37 (n.a.) 0.78 0.91 (n.a.)
N 0.45 0.25 (n.a.) 0.37 0.20 (n.a.) 0.83 0.96 (n.a.)
µ 0.33 0.85 (n.a.) 0.27 0.67 (n.a.) 0.87 0.96 (n.a.)
Table 3: Business cycle statistics [data, bank entry model, (benchmark New Keynesian
model)]
Table 3 shows that the introduction of our ﬁnancial accelerator leads to a
signiﬁcant ampliﬁcation of the generated standard deviations.36 This result is
in line with Jermann and Quadrini (2009) who show that the introduction of
a ﬁnancial sector leads to an important propagation of macroeconomic volatil-
ity.37 Moreover, the generated standard deviations in both absolute and relative
terms are very close to the empirically observed ones. By contrast, the bench-
mark New Keynesian model does not generate enough volatility in output and
consumption.
Naturally, a further advantage of the bank entry model is that we can ad-
35The data for loans, the loan rate, and the number of banks is provided by the Board of the
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The data for the standard macroeconomic variables
is taken from the US department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis) and the US
Department of Labor.
36Remark: The benchmark New Keynesian model does neither include ﬁnancial variables such
as Ot, ot, Nt, or µt nor investment in new banks, It. Consequently, we cannot calculate the
corresponding second moments of these variables. In Table 3 we thus state n.a. (not available).
37Remark: Jermann and Quadrini (2009) develop a model with explicit roles for debt and equity
ﬁnancing and analyze shocks that aﬀect the ﬁrms’ capacity to borrow. They moreover show
that the additional introduction of ﬁnancial shocks lead to a further ampliﬁcation eﬀect. This
also holds true in our framework when for instance considering a shock to loan demand.
34ditionally analyze the moments of ﬁnancial variables. Table 3 reports that
the model performs surprisingly well with respect to this dimension, too. The
model does not only generate an appropriate volatility of aggregate loans and
loans per bank but also depicts the comparatively low volatilities of the mass of
operating banks. The generated price-cost margin is however too volatile. With
respect to the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation, the bank entry model even generates
too much endogenous persistence of the ﬁnancial variables under consideration.
The generated autocorrelations of GDP, consumption, and the real wage are
slightly larger when compared to the benchmark New Keynesian model.
4.2 The Financial Activity Tax and the Financial Transaction
Tax
As Table 3 depicts, the existence of the ﬁnancial sector leads to higher volatil-
ities for key macroeconomic variables. In order to extenuate the additional
source of economic instability, we will now investigate the eﬀects resulting from
the introduction of two ﬁnancial taxes.38 The most prominent taxes being dis-
cussed by politicians in this context – especially in the Euro Area – are the
so-called ’ﬁnancial activity tax’ and the ’ﬁnancial transaction tax’. The respec-
tive tax bases are proﬁts and transactions.
In the case of a ﬁnancial activity tax, the bank has to pay a tax, τd
t , on
proﬁts. In our framework this implies according to (17):




The ﬁnancial activity tax does not aﬀect the optimal loan rate decision. Since
the tax however dampens per period proﬁts, it has a negative eﬀect on bank
value and thus on bank entry.
38Remark: In standard DSGE macro models, proﬁt taxation is lump-sum, i.e. such tax changes
do not aﬀect the resulting dynamics, at all. By contrast, taxes on proﬁts are not lump-sum
when considering an endogenous mass of oligopolistic banks.
35An alternative tax which is especially proposed by German policy makers is
the ﬁnancial transaction tax (or: Tobin (1978) tax) where a bank has to pay a
tax, e τd
t , on each transaction. In our simple banking model, a bank makes only
a single transaction each period by providing an amount of loans oi,t to ﬁrms.
The proﬁt of a bank is then given by
di,t = (rL
i,t − RB
t )oi,t − e τd
t oi,t (46)
In contrast to the ﬁnancial activity tax, the ﬁnancial transaction tax has an
eﬀect on the optimal loan rate decision since it aﬀects the marginal costs of




(1 − λi,t)ζ − 1
(RB
t + e τd
t ) (47)
Since new banks have to pay entry costs proportional to their marginal
costs, the free entry condition must also be modiﬁed correspondingly.
As a consequence, the ﬁnancial transaction tax results in two negative eﬀects
on bank entry and thus on the new ﬁnancial accelerator. First, it dampens per
period proﬁts of banks via additional tax costs. Second, the tax raises the
marginal costs of banks and consequently entry costs. This implies that in line
with the ﬁndings of Lengnick and Wohltmann (2010) the ﬁnancial transaction
tax seems to be more eﬀective in decreasing the volatilities on ﬁnancial markets
and the resulting accelerator eﬀects for the real economy.
In order to extenuate the additional source of economic instability, we now
want to ﬁnd the speciﬁc level of the ﬁnancial activity tax rate and the ﬁnancial
transaction tax rate which decreases the macroeconomic volatility to that of
our benchmark model where our ﬁnancial accelerator is not existent. For the
sake of comparability, we assume that both tax increases occur with the same
degree of persistence as the technology shock.
Figure 15 reports the standard deviation of GDP for diﬀerent tax levels. The
36dashed black lines indicate the standard deviation of GDP which the benchmark
New Keynesian model generates, 0.83.






























































Figure 15: The impact of the ﬁnancial activity tax and the ﬁnancial transaction tax
on the standard deviation of GDP
Figure 15 shows that both ﬁnancial taxes perform qualitatively equivalent.
Small increases in the tax level lead to a decline in macroeconomic volatility,
whereas increases above a certain threshold lead to a rise in macroeconomic
volatility. This result is in line with Lengnick and Wohltmann (2010). Figure
15 moreover indicates that the ﬁnancial transaction tax has signiﬁcantly larger
eﬀects. In the case of the ﬁnancial activity tax, a tax level of 1.15% is needed to
achieve the same volatility level as in the benchmark model without bank entry
and oligopolistic competition. By contrast, there is only need for a ﬁnancial
transaction tax of about 0.41% to generate the same volatility of GDP. This
implies that the additional eﬀect of the latter tax on banks’ marginal costs leads
to a three times larger impact on the volatility of GDP.39
Table 4 reports the second moments of the baseline bank entry model with-
out a ﬁnancial tax (bold numbers) in comparison with the case of a ﬁnancial
activity tax [1.15%] (normal number) and a ﬁnancial transaction tax [0.41%]
39Note however that these values seem to be rather large. For instance the Swedish government
introduces a ﬁnancial transaction taxes between 0.003% and 0.5% in the 1980s.
37(italic number in parenthesis).
Standard deviation Relative standard First-order autocor-
σX deviation σX/σGDP relation Et(Xt,Xt−1)
GDP 1.25 0.83 (0.83) 1.00 1.00 (1.00) 0.84 0.82 (0.82)
C 1.01 0.85 (0.83) 0.81 1.02 (1.00) 0.86 0.83 (0.81)
I 2.36 0.75 (0.85) 1.89 0.90 (1.02) 0.83 0.82 (0.82)
w 1.43 1.09 (1.02) 1.14 1.31 (1.22) 0.89 0.83 (0.82)
O 1.88 1.15 (1.04) 1.51 1.39 (1.25) 0.90 0.84 (0.82)
o 1.71 1.12 (1.03) 1.37 1.35 (1.24) 0.91 0.83 (0.82)
N 0.25 0.07 (0.02) 0.20 0.08 (0.02) 0.96 0.96 (0.96)
µ 0.85 0.26 (0.05) 0.67 0.31 (0.06) 0.96 0.96 (0.96)
Table 4: Business cycle statistics of the baseline bank entry model, the bank
entry model with ﬁnancial activity tax [1.15%], (the bank entry model with ﬁnancial
transaction tax [0.41%])
Table 4 indicates that both taxes are not only able to reduce the volatility
of GDP to the benchmark level but also the volatilities of the other variables
under consideration. In fact, the generated moments of the benchmark New
Keynesian model and that of the bank entry model with ﬁnancial taxes are
very close to each other. Table 4 moreover shows that both ﬁnancial taxes
are appropriate to dampen the volatilities in the ﬁnancial markets, too. In
particular, the standard deviation of the mass of operating banks signiﬁcantly
declines. This eﬀect is especially pronounced in case of the ﬁnancial transaction
tax where the mass of operating banks and consequently the bank mark-up
turns out to be approximately constant.40
5 Conclusion
In order to capture the empirical ﬁndings that the number of banks signiﬁcantly
co-moves with GDP and that bank mark-ups react counter-cyclical, we develop
a New Keynesian macro model which incorporates an oligopolistic banking
sector with endogenous bank entry.
We ﬁnd that the resulting model generates counter-cyclical mark-up move-
40When assuming lower taxes, the mark-up naturally becomes more volatile again.
38ments in the banking sector and large ampliﬁcation and persistence eﬀects.
More precisely, we obtain accelerating eﬀects which are signiﬁcantly larger than
those generated by the famous study of BGG. In particular, we obtain very large
accelerating eﬀects in the case of a monetary policy shock. These results are ro-
bust with diﬀerent assumptions concerning the loan rate rigidity and the death
rate of new banks.
Moreover, we show that banks do not only propagate shocks but can also
be the source of ﬁnancial disturbances which have important implications for
the real economy. Therefore, we analyze the implications of a contractionary
shock to bank value which leads to stagﬂationary eﬀects for the real economy.
We ﬁnally evaluate our model by comparing the second moments of the
generated series with those observed in US data. The analysis shows that the
bank entry model performs remarkable well. More precisely, the model does not
only depict the properties of key macroeconomic variables appropriately but
also of ﬁnancial variables including the mass of banks, the amount of aggregate
loans, and the amount of loans per banks.
Moreover, we analyze the macroeconomic implications of a ﬁnancial activity
tax and a ﬁnancial transaction tax. Our analysis points out that these two
taxes are indeed an appropriate tool to stabilize the ﬁnancial markets and thus
to dampen the volatility of key macroeconomic variables. We ﬁnd that the
ﬁnancial activity tax where banks have to pay a tax on each transaction is
about three times more eﬀective than the ﬁnancial transaction tax where the
tax base is simply per period proﬁts.
Future work should concern about simultaneous bank and ﬁrm entry. This
give rise to further ampliﬁcations and interesting results with respect to the
interdependency between ﬁnancial and real markets. Moreover, we show that
our model generates an endogenous cost-push shock resulting from oligopolistic
competition. This implies a non-trivial role for monetary policy also in the case
of a technology shock or a shock to the interest rate that – in contrast to a(n
39exogenous) cost-push shock – do not generate a trade-oﬀ between stabilizing
inﬂation and output in the standard New Keynesian model. Future work could
thus concern about optimal monetary policy in such an environment.
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